AgentCore Identity has been updated to read a private certificate authority (CA) certificate from AWS Secrets Manager or Amazon S3 and use it when establishing TLS connections to an internal OpenID Connect (OIDC) provider. The change lets agents retrieve OAuth tokens from IdPs that present certificates signed by an organization‑managed CA, eliminating the need for public‑trusted certificates in private networks.
Solution Overview
The new flow adds a trust anchor for the IdP’s load balancer certificate. The CA certificate, which must be a root or intermediate public certificate, is referenced by an AgentCore Identity credential provider. When the agent requests a token, AgentCore Identity reads the CA, validates the IdP’s server certificate, and returns the token to the agent. Connectivity to the IdP occurs through Amazon VPC Lattice, which can be provisioned automatically by the managed option.
Implementation Steps
- Upload the PEM‑encoded CA certificate to
AWS Secrets ManagerorAmazon S3. - Create an AgentCore Identity credential provider that includes the IdP endpoint URLs and a reference to the stored CA certificate.
- AgentCore Identity validates the CA format and stores the reference for runtime use.
- The agent calls the credential provider to obtain an OAuth access token.
- AgentCore Identity routes the request through VPC Lattice, validates the load balancer’s TLS certificate against the private CA, and forwards the token back to the agent.
The walkthrough in the source uses AWS Private Certificate Authority to issue the IdP certificate and Keycloak as the IdP, but any private, third‑party, or self‑signed root CA is supported.
Operational and Security Implications
- Certificate lifecycle management: Rotating the private CA requires updating the stored PEM file and ensuring the new CA is trusted before the old one expires. Because the CA is referenced by the credential provider, the rotation can be performed with minimal agent downtime.
- Access control for the CA artifact: Storing the CA in Secrets Manager or S3 allows fine‑grained IAM policies. Only the IdP team should have write permissions, reducing the risk of unauthorized certificate changes.
- Network path: Private CA support mandates traffic flow through VPC Lattice. Teams must provision a resource gateway in the target VPC and ensure security groups and routing allow the lattice connection.
- Compatibility: Existing agents that use machine‑to‑machine, on‑behalf‑of, or user‑delegated OAuth flows do not need code changes; the private CA is handled entirely by AgentCore Identity.
- Observability: Monitoring the credential provider configuration and VPC Lattice health becomes part of the operational checklist, as failures to validate the private CA will surface as token‑fetch errors.
Related CloudNinjas coverage: AWS.
What This Means For Practitioners
Teams can now keep identity infrastructure inside a private VPC without exposing public certificates, while still enabling Bedrock agents to authenticate securely. The primary actions are to store the CA certificate in a managed secret store, reference it in the credential provider, and verify that VPC Lattice connectivity is correctly configured. Ongoing practice should include regular CA rotation, strict IAM controls on the secret, and health checks on the lattice gateway to avoid token‑retrieval disruptions.


